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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY J. WITHERSPOON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER T. STEWART, et al., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14285 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent GARY J. WITHERSPOON sued 
defendants and prayed for judgment declaring the $1,500.00 
paid by JERRY YECK forfeited as liquidated damages as 
provided in the contract of sale, and for a Writ of 
Replevin requiring the return of certain cattle and that 
he, GARY J. WITHERSPOON, be declared sole owner of said 
property. 
Defendant-Appellant, WALTER STEWART, answered 
praying that the Court find him sole owner of the cattle. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK intervened and asserted a 
security interest in the cattle. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Intervenor, FIRST SECURITY BANK, was granted a 
summary judgment upon its secured interest and was awarded 
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first priority on the proceeds of the sale of the cattle* 
The case was tried upon the issue of whether 
Defendant-Appellant, WALTER STEWART, was a bona fide 
purchaser and entitled to recover against Plaintiff-Respond-
ent, GARY WITHERSPOON. The Court granted judgment for the 
Plaintiff-Respondent and against the Defendant-Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent, GARY J, WITHERSPOON, seeks 
affirmance of the trial court's judgment* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or before the 18th day of February, 197 4, 
JERRY YECK approached the plaintiff, GARY J. WITHERSPOON, 
and asked to purchase his cattle, consisting of 19 steers 
and 16 heifers. He offered to pay to the plaintiff 
$12,325.00* The plaintiff and JERRY YECK entered into an 
agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and JERRY 
YECK agreed to buy the cattle for the sum of $12,325.00. 
Said sum was paid over to the plaintiff by JERRY YECK in 
the form of two checks drawn on Zions First National Bank, 
one for the sum of $11,450.00 and a second check drawn in 
the sum of $815.00. At or about the same time as the 
delivery of checks, the Plaintiff-Respondent delivered to 
JERRY YECK a Bill of Sale consisting of four pages, dated 
February 18, 1974, and a three-page supplement to the Bill 
of Sale, all of which were admitted in evidence upon 
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stipulation of counsel. 
On the 20th day of February, 1974, the plaintiff 
contacted Zions First National Bank to secure payment on 
the two checks and was informed that the checks were not 
good, that the account had been closed. Thereafter, the 
Plaintiff-Respondent contacted JERRY YECK and informed him 
that the checks had not been paid upon presentation and 
that JERRY YECK was not to remove the cattle from their 
corral and that the plaintiff wanted a return of the Bill 
of Sale. The Plaintiff-Respondent secured a return of the 
original Bill of Sale on the 20th day of February, 1974, 
and has maintained the original in his possession since 
that time. 
At the time of the transaction and continuously 
thereafter, GARY J. WITHERSPOON owned and possessed the 
Utah State Department of Agriculture Certificate of 
Registration on the cattle in question. The original Cert-
ificate of Registration on the cattle in question. The 
original Certificate of Registration was offered and 
accepted as an exhibit without objection. At all times 
during the transaction between the 18th day of February, 
1974, and the 24th day of February, 1974, the cattle 
remained in their respective corrals at Mills, Utah and 
Fayette, Utah* 
Upon determination that the checks had been dis-
honored at the bank, GARY J, WITHERSPOON notified the 
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defendant JERRY YECK, that the cattle were to remain in 
their corrals; he further notified the Utah County Sheriff's 
Department, the Utah State Highway Patrol, the Utah County 
Attorney's Office, and the First Security Bank, The 
purpose of his calls was to retain possession of the cattle 
and to alert all persons or organizations that may have an 
interest that someone may attempt to remove the cattle and 
they were not authorized to do so. 
GARY J. WITHERSPOON had not authorized anyone to 
either show his cattle or assist anyone in removing the 
cattle from the corrals at Fayette or Mills. 
On or about the 21st day of February, 1974, which 
was a Thursday, VIRGIL REDMOND, JERRY YECK and others 
journeyed to Fayette and Mills to look at the cattle, and 
upon having done so contacted the Defendant-Appellant, 
WALTER STEWART, by telephone and offered to sell the cattle 
to him. Thereafter WALTER STEWART examined the cattle in 
Fayette and Mills and determined he wanted to make a purchase 
and entered into an agreement with VIRGIL REDMOND who at 
said time was acting as a sales representative for PHILLIP 
GEORGE, The parties came to an agreement whereby the cattle 
were to be sold for the sum of $8,500.00. 
At the time of the negotiations, VIRGIL REDMOND 
represented to WALTER STEWART that he had a Bill of Sale 
from GARY J. WITHERSPOON, and VIRGIL REDMOND displayed the 
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Bill of Sale from Deseret Distributing Company to American 
Federal Corporation, and delivered a copy of a Bill of 
Sale dated February 20, 1974, from American Federal 
Corporation to WALTER STEWART. At no time did WALTER 
STEWART see the original Bill of Sale from GARY J. WITHERSPOON 
to JERRY YECK. On the 21st day of February, 1974, WALTER 
STEWART, in the company of VIRGIL REDMOND and other persons, 
went to the bank and WALTER STEWART secured a cashier's 
check in the sum of $8,500*00, cashed the check and 
delivered the cash to VIRGIL REDMOND, who in turn delivered 
the cash to PHILLIP GEORGE. 
Thereafter on the 24th day of February, 1974, 
WALTER STEWART began loading the cattle on his vehicle, at 
which time a SETH McPHERSON, who was operating the ranch 
upon which the cattle were located, notified GARY J. 
WITHERSPOON of the attempted removal. Witherspoon informed 
him that the removal was unauthorized, and notifed the 
Utah County Sheriff's Department, Highway Patrol, Utah 
County Attorney's Office and the First Security Bank. At 
the request of GARY J. WITHERSPOON the cattle were 
confiscated by the Utah County Sheriff's Office, impounded, 
and ultimately disposed of to First Security Bank, who held 
a security interest in said cattle. 
At no time during the period February 18, 1974, 
until the cattle were confiscated, did any of the parties 
hereto or any other person attempt: to secure a brand 
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inspection on the cattle, and when the Defendant-Respondent 
WALTER STEWART attempted to remove the cattle from Mills, 
it was his intention to transport the cattle from Juab 
County to Utah County, or from one branding district to 
another. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO BE THE SOLE OWNER OF THE CATTLE 
AND THAT NO LEGAL BASIS EXISTED UPON WHICH 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT STEWART COULD CLAIM 
TITLE. 
It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff, GARY J. 
WITHERSPOON, was at the time of the alleged transaction, 
and is still the owner of the Utah State Department of 
Agriculture Certificate of Registration. Title.4-13-11, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
"The certified copy of recordation thus 
secured in the foregoing section shall be 
prima facie evidence of the ownership of 
such animal or animals by the party whose 
brand and mark it might be and shall be 
taken as evidence of ownership in all courts 
of law or equity, or in any criminal proc-
eedings when the title to the animal is 
involved or property to be proved." 
Witherspoon did not transfer his brand at any time, 
and maintained the Certificate of Recordation in his 
possession throughout the transaction and delivered the 
original to the Court at the time of trial, which was marked 
and recieved as an exhibit. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
THE BILL OF SALE BETWEEN AMERICAN FEDERAL 
CORPORATION AND THE DEFENDANT WALTER STEWART 
FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS 
OF 4-13-17 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Title 4-13-17, UCA 1953, was designed specifically 
to combat the problem of cattle rustling, or livestock theft. 
The Act provides among other things that the certified copy 
of the Brand Certificate is evidence of ownership, as 
hereinbefore mentioned and said statute further provides 
the precise manner in which brands or brand marks may be 
transferred. 
The Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, 
(UCA 4-13-1, et sec.) further specifies with particularity 
all requirements of a Bill of Sale for the transfer of 
livestock. 4-13-17 states, 
"Upon the sale, consignment, alienation or 
transfer of title of any livestock, by any 
person in this state, the actual delivery of 
such animals shall be accompanied by a written 
bill of sale from the vendor or the party 
selling to the party purchasing giving the 
number, sex, brands, and marks of each animal, 
date and place of purchase, signature and 
address of both seller and purchaser; provided, 
that any person so selling or transferring title 
to said livestock which are branded and marked 
with any brand and mark not the recorded brand 
and mark of person selling, shall provide proof 
of ownership from whom the livestock was 
purchased and the length of time held in his 
possession." 
The Bill of Sale between American Federal Corporation 
and WALTER STEWART did not comply with the statute in the 
following particulars: 
1. The Bill of Sale did not accompany actual 
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delivery of the animals. 
2. The Bill of Sale does not provide proof of 
ownership marked by a brand not that of the vendor. 
3. The Bill of Sale does not record the length 
of time the vendor held the cattle in his possession. 
4. The Bill of Sale did not contain the 
signatures and addresses of both the seller and the 
purchaser. 
The identical deficiencies occur in the Bill of 
Sale between Deseret Distributing Corporation and American 
Federal Corporation. Therefore, each sale from the 
Plaintiff-Respondent through the two corporations to 
WALTER STEWART failed to comply with the Livestock Brand 
and Anti-Theft Act, which was designed to protect the public 
and prevent illegal sale of livestock. The Act was 
designed to protect the defendant Stewart from the very 
problem now before the Court. 
In Pugh vs. Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d 
463, 1969, the Utah Court held at page 466: 
"Nevertheless, the mandate of the statute is 
clear. A transfer of title is valid only if 
effected in conformity with Section 4-13-17, 
UCA 1953." 
In Galeppi vs. C. Swanston & Son, 107 Cal. App. 30, 
290 Pac. 116, 19 30, the California Court reached the same 
conclusion. In that case the plaintiff gave possession of 
his cattle to one Charles King for a check for the purchase 
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price. The plaintiff refused to give a Bill of Sale until 
the check was honored. The defendants in the case bought 
the cattle from King. Plaintiff commenced an action for 
conversion of the cattle against the defendants when the 
check was dishonored. King had left for parts unknown, 
just as the unserved named defendants have in the present 
case. The California Court held that the sale was void 
because where a statute is designed for the protection of 
the public and prescribes a penalty, that penalty is 
equivalent to an express prohibition and a contract in 
violation of its provisions is void. 
This is the identical situation in Utah. UCA 
4-13-66 provides, 
"Any person who violates any provision 
of this Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
except as herein otherwise provided." 
When WALTER STEWART entered into a contract for 
the purchase of cattle, but did not conform to UCA 4-13-77, 
he entered into a contract that was void in law and there-
fore received no title. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
THE ALLEGED SALE FROM WHICH DEFENDANT STEWART 
CLAIMS TITLE WAS VOID FOR FAILURE TO SECURE 
A BRAND INSPECTION CERTIFICATE. 
The Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, at 
Section 4-13-77.5 specifically provides: 
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"All changes of ownership through private 
sales or transactions, or at public auctions 
or commission houses, shall be accompanied by 
a brand inspection certificate." 
In the present case, no brand inspection cert-
ificate accompanied either the sale between American Federal 
Corporation and WALTER STEWART or the sale between Deseret 
Distributing Corporation and American Federal Corporation 
or Witherspoon and Yeck. At the time of trial, defendant 
Stewart acknowledged that the cattle were to be transferred 
from one brand inspection district to another, in violation 
of Title 4-13-28, UCA, which provides, 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to 
transport by truck any livestock originating 
at any point within a district to a point 
beyond the boundaries of said district until 
the same shall have been duly inspected or 
written authority given by the board or by 
one of its authorized inspectors, to transport 
subject to inspection at some station en route 
as hereinafter required by this Act." 
In Pugh vs. Stratton, the Court stated that the 
sale was void where the statute was designed for the 
protection of the public and prescribes a penalty, that 
penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition, and the 
contract in violation of its provisions is void. 
POINT IV 
THE CASE OF WILSON V. BURROWS RELIED UPON 
BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THE PRESENT CASE. 
The case of Wilson v. Burrows, 27 Utah 2d 436, 
497 P.2d 240 (1972) is readily distinguished from the 
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present situation* 
In Wilson, the contest is between a conditional 
vendor of real property and a bank as a subsequent secured 
party. The vendors sold real estate, cattle, and other 
items under a uniform real estate contract. The vendee 
then pledged the cattle described under the contract to a 
bank as collateral for a loan, as specifically allowed by 
the real estate contract. The bank perfected its security 
interest in accordance with UCA 70A-9-302. The vendors of 
the property some months later also perfected. The question 
before the court was which party had the prior security 
interest in the cattle. 
On the basis of the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code as adopted in UCA 70A, the court ruled for 
the bank. The vendor tried to assert the provisions of 
the Utah Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, Section 4-13-1, 
et seq., UCA 1953. 
The court held its provisions did not apply to 
this situation concluding that, "In any event, the [vendors] 
cannot now claim that their contracts entered into with 
[the vendee] were not made in good faith." 
The differences between Wilson and the present 
case are vital and extreme. In Wilson, the vendor specific-
ally provided for the cattle to be released to the vendee 
for the purpose of allowing a third party to acquire a 
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secured interest. In the present case the vendor promised 
to release the cattle only on fulfillment of a condition 
precedent namely to pay the full purchase price. 
In Wilson, the vendor had to assert his own bad 
faith in order to void the sale. In the present case all 
that is asserted is the bad faith of the Plaintiff-
Respondent's vendee. 
In Wilson, the cattle form part of the financing 
arrangement of real property. In the present case the 
cattle are the sole subject of sale. 
In Wilson, to allow the vendor to make the contract 
and then assert its voidness because of the vendor's 
personal neglect in filing a security agreement would offend 
justice. In the present case the Plaintiff-Respondent is 
claiming the protection of a law designed to cover and 
protect both himself and the Defendant-Appellant. 
A crucial difference between Wilson and the present 
case is that had the vendor in Wilson complied fully with 
the Act the result reached by the Court would have been the 
same because the result was determined by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Had the Defendant-Appellant, Stewart, 
complied with the Act he would have discovered that the 
people he purchased from did not have good title. 
CONCLUSION 
The unserved named defendants are clearly the 
most blame worthy in this case. If the police could find 
them they would be subject to more than civil liability. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Cl rk Law Schoo , BYU. 
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The present case presents the problem of choosing between 
two innocent parties. The primary question is, who was in 
the better position to discover the fraud of the unserved 
defendants. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Witherspoon, did all he 
could to prevent taking of the cattle as soon as he 
realized the checks had been dishonored. He recovered 
possession of the contract and Bill of Sale given to Yeck. 
He informed Yeck, the sheriff and the bank that the cattle 
were not to be moved. He did all that he reasonably could 
to prevent transfer of the cattle. 
Defendant-Appellant Stewart could have discovered 
the fraud of the other defendants had he complied with the 
statute. If he had secured a proper Bill of Sale he would 
have known that Yeck and the others never had possession or 
title to the cattle. He was told by Seth McPherson at the 
time he seized the cattle that Witherspoon was asserting 
title. 
If Stewart had secured a brand inspection as 
required by statute, he would have known that title still 
rested in Witherspoon and not in any of the parties with 
whom he dealt. Clearly Defendant-Appellant Stewart was 
under obligation to comply with the statutes designed to 
protect him from just this type of happening. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, GARY J. WITHERSPOON, is 
therefore entitled to have the judgment of the lower court 
affirmed. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 
1976. 
RICHARD RICHARDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Walter T. Stewart, 
pro se, RFD #2, Box 199, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660, this 
/$ day of March, 1976. 
v/^ 
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